I present a model of optimal contracts between firms and workers, under limited commitment and with worker savings. In the model, firms provide insurance against unemployment through targeting a frontloaded path of wages which encourages wealth accumulation. I provide analytical results characterising the wage and savings schedules and the path of consumption during employment and unemployment. I then consider how unemployment benefits affect risk sharing through private markets. I find that benefits should be frontloaded; the government has the incentive to drive the allocation to the point where the firm's participation constraint binds. At this point wages are equal to productivity in every period, wealth exceeds the buffer stock level, and consumption and savings drop over time. The drop in the level of consumption during unemployment is mitigated. Finally, I compare the optimal contract model to the standard heterogeneous agent model whereby wealth is utilized for self-insurance purposes. I show that the two models are equivalent under the optimal UI policy.
Introduction
Whether governments should provide insurance against the risk that individuals face in the labor market has been a long standing debate in economics. Much of the discussion over the scope of public policy centers around the notion that it can crowd out the private insurance arrangements of individuals, with a widespread belief that the scope of policy is limited when such arrangements are in place. Theoretical work seeking to describe this tradeoff is ample: Attanasio and Rios Rull (2000) and Thomas and Worrall (2007) (among others) study models with limited commitment contracts between risk averse households and show that public insurance can crowd out private risk sharing with adverse effects on welfare. Hansen and Imhrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (2002) (among others) study the properties of optimal unemployment insurance within the heterogeneous agents model of precautionary savings. They illustrate that unemployment benefits discourage individuals from accumulating wealth, reducing the scope of self insurance.
This paper investigates the effects of unemployment benefits in an economy where private risk sharing is a contract under limited commitment offered by firms to their workforce. The contract is broadly similar to the self enforcing wage models of Rudanko (2009 Rudanko ( , 2011 , Thomas and Worrall (1988) however, in contrast to these papers, I assume that agents have access to a storage technology and can accumulate assets over time. The model is cast in an equilibrium environment whereby individuals choose optimally their savings, and the distribution of wealth is determined endogenously as the outcome of these choices. The model therefore weds the limited commitment contract with the standard framework of heterogeneous agents and wealth accumulation; I depart from this framework through introducing wages which are set optimally and not assumed equal to labor productivity in every period.
I establish the following results: First, the contract offers a higher wage at the start of the job, to individuals that have low wealth, in order to encourage savings. These savings are used to (partially) insure workers against the risk of unemployment, the only shock to the income process considered in the model. The allocation is stationary after one period, featuring constant consumption, wages, wealth and utility over the life of the match. Second, I show that when agents are initially wealthy, the optimal contract sets wages equal to productivity in every period. In this case, consumption and wealth drop through time until a constant level of assets is reached. This level defines the buffer stock of savings in the model.
As is well known, under limited commitment the optimal allocation needs to satisfy two participation constraints: Both the firm and the worker must be better off in the match than if they separate. In models which feature uncertainty in the level of productivity [e.g. Thomas and Worrall (1988) ] this implies that the two parties need to give up risk sharing to satisfy the constraints. In the simple model analyzed in this paper, which assumes that productivity is constant through time, the constraints influence the properties of wealth accumulation and in turn, influence risk sharing against unemployment which depends on assets.
Under the assumptions that I make over preferences I obtain that the only constraint which becomes relevant in equilibrium is the firm's constraint. Indeed, in all the versions of the model considered, the allocation corresponds to either an unconstrained (Pareto) optimum or a constrained optimum in which the firm's constraint is binding. The previous results can be interpreted in light of these remarks: An unconstrained Pareto optimal allocation features a constant ratio of marginal utilities over time. When a participation constraint is hit the level of consumption of the party which needs to be made better off increases [see Kocherlakota (1996) ]. Since the firm is assumed risk neutral, the ratio of marginal utilities coincides with the marginal utility of the worker. When the participation constraint of the firm is binding the worker's consumption drops, and when it is not binding, her consumption remains constant. The model yields the sharp prediction that in the first case, assets exceed the buffer stock and in the second, they fall short of the buffer stock. These properties are established analytically.
I then turn to investigate the effects of government provided unemployment insurance with particular focus on the timing of benefits. The key finding is that the government should frontload unemployment insurance; it is preferable (welfare maximizing) to pay a large benefit in the first period (quarter) of the unemployment spell and set benefits to a low but positive level in subsequent periods.
To understand this result it is important to outline the following: First, as is common in the optimal contracts literature, I assume that the firm and the worker discount the future at the same rate, β. Second, I assume that assets earn a gross return r, but under incomplete financial markets it must be that βr < 1 for the equilibrium to be well defined [see Huggett (1993) ]. With these assumptions the firm has access to a storage technology which earns a superior rate of return than assets do in the market. When it is optimal for the worker to accumulate wealth, she must borrow from the firm (through a frontloaded wage) and increase her endowment. The cost of borrowing is proportional to the difference between the two rates of return, and because borrowing is costly, complete insurance against unemployment becomes suboptimal. The only case where consumption does not drop considerably in unemployment is when the firm's participation constraint is binding. In this case, the wealth level of the agent already exceeds the buffer stock and she does not have to bear the cost of borrowing from the firm.
Consider now a UI scheme which pays high benefits in the first period of unemployment and subsequently reduces unemployment income considerably. Given this policy, the newly unemployed agent is induced to save to ward off the risk of a prolonged spell. Since in the model (and in the data) a large fraction unemployed individuals find jobs after one quarter, they arrive to their new jobs with a high wealth endowment. Their wealth exceeds the buffer stock and the participation constraints bind in equilibrium. For this reason, UI policies which concentrate payments in the first period of unemployment perform considerably better. The importance of this channel is shown to depend on the level of interest rates. This paper is related to several strands in the literature. First, there is a considerable literature of models of heterogenous agents and precautionary savings. As is well known, these models predict that i) individuals accumulate savings (and consumption increases over time) until the buffer stock is built and ii) if the level of wealth exceeds the buffer stock, then consumption and wealth drop through time [see for example Aiyagari (1994) among many others]. A key innovation of my paper is to replace the assumption that workers are paid their marginal product each period with an optimal contracting scheme which is widely viewed as an alternative to wage models without commitment. The intertemporal behavior predicted by the model is similar, however, as I explained previously, wealth accumulation takes place in only one period and consumption remains constant when the agent wants to save. When the firm's participation constraint is binding the two models become identical.
Second, limited commitment models with savings are not abundant in the literature. An important contribution is that of Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000) , hereafter LTW, the first who studied this problem in the context of mutual insurance between risk averse households.
1 They illustrate that intertemporal optimization leads to an Euler equation featuring terms which capture the effect of wealth on the limited commitment friction. In my model because the firm is risk neutral and the firm's constraint is the only one which is relevant in equilibrium, the standard Euler equation holds as an equality. The predictions of the theory for wealth and consumption are, therefore, not driven by any distortion associated with limited commitment; individuals optimize intertemporally as they do in standard theories of heterogeneous agents.
These issues have been recently studied in Karaivanov and Martin (2015) , hereafter KM, who characterize the properties of optimal consumption and savings in the context of equilibria without commitment where wealth is the sole state variable (Markov perfect contracts). Though their analysis includes a comparison between the Markov contract and the limited commitment allocation, they focus on the case where the firm can commit, the worker is indifferent (initially) between remaining in and opting out of the contract. As I previously explained, in my model the firm's participation constraint becomes the crucial constraint in equilibrium, the focus is on the case where the worker extracts all the surplus from the match initially. Moreover, whereas KM formalize income risks through a stochastic endowment process, I model them as unemployment risks. My results are complementary to theirs.
The prediction of the theory I present, that wages and wealth are linked, is not uncommon in the literature. Models which determine wages through Nash bargaining and allow workers to save [for example see Krusell et al. (2010) and Nakajima (2012)], reach a similar presumption, even though the wage profiles predicted by these theories are quite different from the ones I obtain in my model. To show that the frontloaded wage property is not at odds with the data, I argue that it can be interpreted as a constant wage and severance payment scheme. I then utilize the model to evaluate UI policies in the USA. In some states benefits are reduced when individuals receive severance compensation, in others it is not the case. The second group of states is closer to the welfare maximizing policy predicted by the model. Pissarides (2010) is another paper which explores the interplay between severance payments and unemployment benefits.
Finally, as discussed previously, the paper is related to the sizable literature which considers the impact of unemployment insurance within the heterogeneous agent framework. Hansen and Imhrohoroglu (1992) are concerned with characterising the optimal (permanent) level of benefits when individuals receive job opportunities exogenously but may choose to reject them. Wang and Williamson (2002) consider an environment where unemployed and employed individuals exert effort, the former to find jobs and the latter to keep their jobs. They find that the welfare gains from unemployment insurance are not substantial. The model presented in this paper is closer to Wang and Williamson (2002) but it leaves out "job retention" effort. I focus on an environment where individuals lose their jobs through the arrival of an exogenous "destruction" shock, this simplification is made for the sake of highlighting the properties of the optimal contract.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the economic environment. Section 3 discusses the implications of the optimal contract. Section 4 calibrates the model. Section 5 contains the main results on the effects of unemployment insurance. Section 6 presents several robustness exercises and extensions. A final section concludes.
The model

Economic environment
Preferences. There is a continuum (measure one) of infinitely lived, risk averse agents with preferences of the following form:
c t denotes the consumption of a general multipurpose good. s t is a search intensity variable with s t ∈ [0, 1] and v(s t ) denotes the disutility of search. v satisfies v(0) = 0, v s (s t ) > 0 and v ss (s t ) > 0. β is the discount factor. As in Wang and Williamson (2002) and Young (2004) a model period t represents one quarter. Employment opportunities. Every period, a fraction e = 1 − u of all individuals are employed, matched with firms, the remaining u agents are unemployed, waiting for a job offer to arrive. The arrival rate of offers to unemployed individuals is given by γ(s t ), where γ is a technology mapping search effort to a job finding probability. When matched, the employed agent (worker) produces y units of output per period. The firm does not search actively for a worker and when the job starts it is assumed to earn zero profits in expectation. Moreover, employed agents also do not search (hence s t = 0 for them), their matches terminate at an exogenous rate λ per unit of time. When this happens they become unemployed.
Unemployment insurance. Let j = 0, 1, 2, … denote the number of periods that an individual has spent in unemployment prior to the current period. An agent with an index j is at her j + 1 period. j = 0 applies to a newly unemployed agent. The government provides insurance against unemployment in the form of benefits denoted by b j . Benefits depend on the index j to show that the income received varies with the duration of the spell. Not all unemployed individuals are eligible for benefits: There is a horizon m beyond which unemployment income is equal to zero. Therefore, b j = 0, j ≥ m and b j > 0, j < m. For the UI scheme in the US we have that m = 2.
To finance benefits, taxes (τ) are levied on employed individuals each period. It is assumed that the government runs a balanced budget. Therefore, we have that eτ = ∑ j < m u j b j , where u j denotes the number of unemployed agents who are running their j + 1 period of joblessness.
Financial markets. Financial markets are incomplete. Agents can hold a non-state contingent asset, subject to an ad hoc (no borrowing) constraint. The gross interest rate on the asset is denoted by r. Following Wang and Williamson (2002) I consider an economy without capital. I impose βr < 1 so that asset positions do not diverge [see Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) ].
Value functions
Employed agents. As discussed previously, each match generates a per period output equal to y. Because firms earn zero profits at the start of the match, one possible firm-worker contract is to pay a wage y each period and let the worker accumulate savings to self-insure against the job separation risk. This arrangement is considered by most papers in the literature. However, it is not (necessarily) optimal; insofar as the firm is risk neutral and the worker is risk averse there could be a different payment profile that (Pareto) dominates the flat wage contract.
I describe the Pareto optimal allocation in this subsection. To do so I utilize the recursive formulation of LTW which is broadly applied in the literature of self-enforcing labor contracts. Let J t be the present discounted (profit) value of the firm, a t the stock of wealth of the worker, and W(a t , J t ) the lifetime utility of the worker. The optimal contract maximizes W subject to a sequence of constraints. Among these are the participation constraints J t ≥ 0, and W t ≥ U(a t , 0) where U(a t , 0) is the lifetime utility of a newly unemployed individual. These constraints ensure that the optimal allocation makes both the firm and the worker (weakly) prefer to be matched rather than to separate for all t.
The recursive representation of the contract is:
subject to:
(3) is the worker's budget constraint. (4) is the so called promise keeping constraint; it imposes that the firm's expected profits equal J. The firm earns y − w this period, where w denotes the wage, and discounts the (expected) future profit value [(1 − λ) J′] at rate 1 . The worker chooses a′, w and the continuation utility J′ for the firm. Two remarks are in order: First, note that it is common in the literature to represent optimal contracts letting the firm choose allocations subject to the worker receiving a predetermined level of utility. This is the benchmark followed by Thomas and Worrall (1988) and Rudanko (2009) , KM and many others. I chose to work with W(a, J) for convenience; it allows me to (subsequently) define in the unemployed worker's program, the payoff from finding a job using the solution to (2) and setting J = 0. This is without loss of generality. One can derive the same optimal allocation from (2) as from a Bellman equation which maximizes firm profits. Second, even though it holds that J = 0 at the start of each match, it is important to consider values for J different from zero in the value function. As will become evident later, for a wage profile that is not constant over time we have that J 0 = 0 but J t ≠ 0 for t > 0; the total wage paid between periods 0 and t − 1 is not equal to ty. In a subsequent paragraph I describe how the sequence of Js evolves over time.
Unemployed agents. Equilibrium payoffs for unemployed individuals solve the following functional equation:
From program (6) we can derive the following optimality conditions:
) (with equality if +1 > 0) 4 where ( ) denotes the agent's consumption in unemployment (employment) in t. The definition of the competitive equilibrium is given in the Appendix A.
Implications
This section studies the implications of the optimal contract. I derive theoretically the optimal wage, consumption and asset paths. To conserve space I show the paths in the case where the worker's participation constraint never binds, the only constraint that may bind is the firm's constraint. As discussed previously, this property characterizes all of the models solved in this paper. It is a consequence of the assumptions I make over the relative discount rates of the worker and the firm (see discussion and examples in the Online Appendix A).
5 In particular,
Assumption 1
The discount factor of the firm satisfies 1 = . Moreover, it holds that < = 1 and ≥ 1.
Assumption 2
i) It holds that ( , 0) > ( , ) for all j. ii) U(a, j) is strictly increasing in a and strictly concave.
Assumption 1 imposes that the firm and the worker discount the future at equal rates; this is standard in the literature of self enforcing labor contracts. Assumption 2 lists desirable technical properties of the value functions. i) requires that the surplus from a new match is strictly positive and at all wealth levels. Since I have assumed that the worker does not derive disutility from working, i) requires that unemployment benefits are not that high so that agents set s(a, j) = 0 for some j. Under all the benefit schemes considered subsequently Assumption 2 will hold.
Intertemporal behavior
From the first order conditions of program (2) (see Online Appendix A) we can derive the following equations:
where ϕ t is the multiplier on the participation constraint of the firm, χ t is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
Consumption in employment. (7) gives the optimal consumption path. If ϕ t = 0 we have = +1 ; consumption remains constant over the life of the match. However, when ϕ t > 0 (the firm's participation constraint binds) we get
; the level of consumption drops over time.
As discussed previously, the marginal utility 1 represents the relative weight of the firm and the worker in the Pareto optimal allocation. 6 If the participation constraint is slack the weight remains constant over time. If the constraint binds in t + 1, then consumption must drop to ensure that the relative weight of the firm increases. (8) gives the consumption of the worker if she remains employed in t + 1 relative to her consumption if she becomes unemployed. The ratio +1 +1 determines the scope of insurance of the optimal contract; if consumption drops considerably in unemployment the insurance value is smaller and conversely, if consumption does not drop then the contract can completely insure the worker against an unemployment spell which lasts for one period. Insurance is not perfect even when +1 +1 = 1 because unemployment typically lasts for more than a period and assets and consumption drop during unemployment spells. When the match is destroyed the worker is beyond the reach of the firm and must rely on government benefits to mitigate further consumption loses.
Consumption in unemployment.
Off corners the right hand side of (8) becomes: 1 + ( 1 − 1) 1 . The unemployment spell leads to a drop in consumption that is proportional to the ratio of 1 over r. The worker can insure her consumption through increasing the wealth level a t . As I will later show, to do this "optimally" she will "borrow" from the firm, where "borrowing" means to receive a higher wage today and invest in a t . From the promise keeping constraint, the interest cost of this "loan" is ≡ 
The standard equality between the cost of an extra unit of savings today ( 1 ) and the future benefit
) holds in the model if a t + 1 > 0. As discussed previously, this property derives from the fact that the firm's constraint is the only one that may bind in equilibrium. 
Wage profiles
Unconstrained optimum. I now characterize the behavior of wages in the model. I first characterize the optimal wage path in the case of an unconstrained optimum, subsequently, I explain the properties of the wage profile when the firm's constraint is binding.
Proposition 1
Assume that = 0 and = 0 for = 0, 1, 2, ..... We can show that: i) Wages are constant for = 1, 2, ... i.e. = , > 0. ii) The initial wage could either satisfy 0 > or 0 = . In the latter case it must be that = .
Proof. i) follows from the fact that = +1 [e.g. (7)]. Since the ratio of the marginal utility of consumption in employment and unemployment is constant and
[from (8)], by the envelope condition on the unemployed agent's value function ( ′ ( +1 , 0) =
+1
) and the fact that +1 is constant for t ≥ 0, we have that a 1 = a 2 = a 3 = …. From the worker's budget constraint we have:
Since the RHS of this equation is constant we can write w t = for t > 0.
ii) states that the initial wage could be larger than . By the stationarity of wages from t = 1 onwards and the firm's promise keeping constraint we can write:
. 9 It follows that if w 0 > then w 0 > y and < y (otherwise J 0 ≠ 0).
Could the initial wage be smaller than y thus leading to an extraction of the worker's wealth endowment? The answer is no. In this case the wage profile violates the firm's participation constraint. Assume the converse: Let the firm pay w 0 < y in the initial period. Under zero initial profits the firm must then offer > y. It earns negative profits from t = 1 onwards. This violates participation. ■ Proposition 1 tells us that it may be optimal for the worker to frontload wage payments. As discussed in the previous subsection, the worker may find it optimal to "borrow from the firm" and invest in a t , this allows her to partially insure against the unemployment risk. Borrowing from the firm occurs through the frontloaded wage. If it is optimal to set w 0 > y we have that a t > a 0 , t ≥ 1.
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Notice that Proposition 1 imposes ϕ t = 0 for all t. This may seem a very restrictive case; if we have ϕ t > 0 for some t > 0 then the wage profile is not the one described previously. The following result establishes that if the firm's constraint does not bind initially it will never bind, the wage profile is the one described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2
Assume that = 0, = 0, 1, 2, .... and 0 = 0. We can show that = 0 for = 1, 2, .....
For the sake of brevity the proof is provided in the Appendix A. From Proposition 2 we can easily show that if the firm's constraint does not bind in a given period t it will not bind in t + 1, t + 2, …. This property follows from the recursive program and will prove useful subsequently. Now consider the profile of firm profits implied by Propositions 1 and 2. We have that J 0 = 0 for all matches, however, J t = > 0, t ≥ 1 (where is constant) when w 0 > y. This explains why it is important to consider values of J exceeding zero in the Bellman equation.
The firm's participation constraint. Let me now derive the shape of the wage profile under the assumption that the firm's constraint binds. The following property is useful:
Proposition 3
Suppose that > 0 for some > 0. Then it must be that > 0 for = 0, 1, 2, ...., − 1.
In words, if the participation constraint of the firm binds in T then it binds in all periods preceding T.
Proof. Suppose the converse: assume that the constraint binds in T but does not bind in some t < T. This is in contradiction with Proposition 2 (and the property that if the constraint does not bind in one period, it never binds again). Moreover, as we previously saw, the allocation is stationary when the participation constraint does not bind. Assets, wages and consumption are constant over time. It follows that the payoffs for the worker and the firm (W(a t , J t ) and J t ) are also constant. If J t > 0 for t = 1, 2, … T then J T + 1 > 0 and therefore ϕ T = 0. ■
Proposition 4
Suppose that > 0 for = 0, 1, 2, ... . Then, wages are equal to y for all t.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Buffer stock of savings
We have seen that the optimal contract gives to the worker a frontloaded wage which allows her to build a stock of assets and insure against unemployment. After the initial investment the allocation is stationary and assets remain constant through time. This holds insofar as the firm's participation constraint does not bind. If it does bind, then consumption drops through time, wages are constant and equal to y and assets are therefore reduced. In this subsection I highlight an additional feature of the model. I show that the state space can be divided into two regions: when a 0 is low, wages are frontloaded and assets increase between periods 0 and 1; when a 0 is large then the firm's constraint is binding. This implies that the optimal contract features a buffer stock of savings. This property is common with the standard model of heterogeneous agents. I explain here the differences between the two frameworks.
To show the above, I use a setup which I can solve analytically. Unfortunately, it is not possible to prove the buffer stock property more generally; however, it holds in all the simulations of the model considered in this paper. 11 The following assumptions are employed in this section:
Assumption 3 i) unemployment is an absorbing state; employed individuals face a constant probability λ of getting fired; when the separation shock arrives agents remain unemployed forever. ii) benefits equal zero at all horizons and therefore taxes are also zero. iii) to further simplify, I assume that = 1.
For brevity I leave all of the derivations to the Online Appendix A. I obtain the following:
Result 1
Under Assumption 3, the optimal wage satisfies:
the firm's constraint binds).
(1− )
is the buffer stock of savings in the model. If 0 >(
then > and assets are reduced over time.
we have = forever.
Result 2
Let ( 0 , 0) represent the optimal savings schedule in the first period of the optimal contract. We have that:
where the expression for ( 0 , 0) in the unconstrained optimum follows from Result 1. To characterize ( 0 , 0) in the case where assets exceed the buffer stock the following result is useful.
Result 3
Suppose that 0 ≥(
1− )
. Then ( , 0) =̃( ) wherẽ( ) solves the following Bellman equation:
In other words, when the firm's constraint binds, the worker solves the Bellman equation of the flat wage contract, the standard model of heterogeneous agents and wealth accumulation. This clearly follows from Proposition 4; since wages always equal y, we have that J t = 0 ∀t. Effectively, J can be dropped from the list of state variables in the optimal program.̃( ) makes use of this property. From Result 3 it follows readily that g OC (a 0 , 0) = g HA (a 0 ) (where g HA is optimal savings in the heterogeneous agent model) whenever 0 >(
. 12 The difference in the savings behavior between the two models derives from when a 0 falls short of the buffer stock. It is well known, that in the heterogeneous agents framework precautionary savings gradually increase over time until the buffer stock is built [e.g. Deaton (1991) and Aiyagari (1994) ]. The worker's consumption also increases until it reaches the stationary point y. The optimal contract model, however, predicts that when 0 <(
, is constant, and from t = 1 onwards assets will also remain constant. Hence, the wealth level(
is practically never reached unless the worker starts with this initial level. Figure 1 shows the savings schedules. The solid line represents g OC (a 0 , 0), the dashed line g HA (a 0 ). The dashed-dotted line is at 45 degrees. The shaded area represents the range of wealth over which the firm's constraint binds and wealth exceeds the buffer stock. The two schedules coincide within the shaded area, however, outside the shaded region (unconstrained optimum) the optimal contract features higher savings for any a 0 . Notes: The solid line shows the asset accumulation rule. The shaded area plots the range of assets over which the firm's participation constraint binds. The x axis denotes the initial wealth endowment of the worker. The asset accumulation rule applies only in the first period over the range of wealth in the non-shaded area. From period two onwards assets are constant, in the unconstrained optimum, hence the rule becomes equal to the 45 degree line. The dashed line shows the asset rule in the case of the flat contract [e.g. the solution to equation (10)]. The x axis now denotes wealth in any period. The dashed-dotted line is at 45 degrees.
These differences in savings have important effects on the scope of insurance through assets in the two models. From Figure 1 we see that if workers have low wealth, they build a large wealth endowment much faster under the optimal contract. In contrast, in the flat contract, assets will slowly accumulate, but insofar as the worker remains employed for many periods, they will converge to(
. The optimal contract can better insure workers against the risk of an early dismissal, under the flat contract the worker may ultimately possess a larger wealth stock.
Borrowing constraints and wages
So far my derivations left out the borrowing constraint. It was assumed that χ t = 0 for all t. This omission was deliberately made; in principle, this constraint will not bind, the reason being that insofar as the worker experiences a drop in income during unemployment, she will always hold positive assets. 13 This however, will not hold in all of the benefit schemes considered in this paper. As I will later show, when the government provides a very large benefit in the first period of the unemployment spell, then it maybe optimal to set a t = 0 for some t, not to invest in assets. To deal with this case, in this subsection, I briefly explain what happens when χ t > 0. The following Proposition summarizes the main takeaway:
Proposition 5
Suppose that the optimal contract sets > 0 for some > 0. Then the firm's participation constraint binds in every period.
Proof. Let us first assume that the optimum is unconstrained. Since assets are constant after t = 1 we have that χ 0 = χ 1 = … >0 (the borrowing constraint always binds). Let the worker initially have assets a 0 ≥ 0. Then, from the budget constraints we have = 0 − + ( 0 − 1 ) = 0 − + 0 and also = − . Therefore,
Consider first, the case where a 0 = 0. We have that w 0 = = y. Second, assume that a 0 > 0; it holds that w 0 < . Hence, w 0 < y and > y. This violates the firm's participation constraint. It follows readily that ϕ 0 > 0. From Proposition 4 we know that wages equal y in all periods (hence ϕ t > 0, t = 1, 2, …).
Second, assume that χ t > 0 for t > 0 and a 0 , a 1 , …, a t − 1 > 0 = a t . In this case the worker's assets are decreasing over time (or at least they are decreasing between t − 1 and t). From the previous results we know that this can only be when the participation constraint of the firm is binding. From Proposition 3 we know that if ϕ t > 0 we must have ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 , …, ϕ t − 1 > 0. The firm's constraint binds in all periods before t. From Proposition 4 we know that wages are equal to y in all periods and therefore also ϕ t + 1 , ϕ t + 2 , … > 0. ■
Calibration
Following Wang and Williamson (2002) I assume that the search function is of the following form: ( ) = 1 − (− ) where is a constant. The cost of search is given by v(s) = s δ . I set δ = 2. To pin down the separation rate λ I assume, that over a monthly horizon workers face a 2.5% probability of losing their job. This value is well within the range considered in the search and matching literature. Since one period in the model corresponds to one quarter, I have to recover from this assumption the quarterly value for λ. To accomplish this I first assume that the stationary unemployment rate is 6.2% (average in the CPS over the years [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] . This gives me a value for the monthly job finding probability of 0.3782 (denote this by γ monthly ). Then, the number of unemployed individuals that have a duration of up to one quarter is given by
2 ). The quarterly value for λ is equal to 0 1− since the stationary unemployment rate applies at all horizons. Hence, λ = 0.0503. = 2.54 is chosen to hit the unemployment rate target.
The baseline benefit scheme is calibrated to the current UI scheme in the US. Individuals receive 50% of their past income for the first two quarters in unemployment and subsequently receive zero benefits.
14 To simplify, I set b j = 0.5y for j = 0, 1 and b j = 0 for j ≥ 2. This is roughly consistent with the above, since individuals in the model on average earn y every period. I normalize the value of y to unity.
Finally, I calibrate the discount rate and the market interest rate as follows: I choose a value for r equal to one as Wang and Williamson (2002) do. This means that workers have access to a storage technology and they earn zero return on their savings. For parameter β which given r governs consumption loses in unemployment, I target a value so that the model yields an average (over an annual horizon) consumption loss suffered by agents that experience unemployment of 6.8%. This is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Gruber (1997) . This procedure gives β = 0.990062.
The impact of unemployment benefits
5.1 Wages, savings and consumption under the baseline UI scheme Figure 2 shows the wage schedule offered in the first period of the match (solid-blue line), as a function of the initial wealth endowment of the worker. Consistent with previous theoretical results, wages are frontloaded when a 0 is low. At zero wealth the worker receives a wage equal to 1.42 in the first period. Moreover, w 0 exceeds one up to a wealth level of 0.82, the buffer stock of savings in the benchmark model. When a 0 > 0.82 the firm's constraint is binding and wages always equal unity. These numbers are repeated in the first row of Table 1. Notes: The table shows the effects of various UI schemes. b j is the level of benefits given in period j + 1 of an unemployment spell. j = 0 corresponds to benefits received during the first quarter, j = 1 during the second and so on. b * denotes the optimal policy. As discussed in text, we have * 0 = 1.55 * 1 = 0.1 * ≥2 = 0.25. For the remaining rows the level of unemployment benefits in j is reported when b j > 0. % u ≤1 represents the fraction of unemployed individuals with duration less than or equal to 2 quarters.̃is the percentage increment in consumption needed for individuals to be as well off as under the baseline UI policy. Table 2 (column 1) shows the fraction of employed individuals with wealth below 0.82. This fraction equals 1. In other words, all employed individuals (in the steady state distribution) are at the unconstrained optimum. This property can be explained as follows: Suppose that some agents are employed and have wealth exactly equal to 0.82. In employment their wealth will remain constant and they will receive w 0 = = y. However, when they become unemployed they will reduce their asset level since their income will drop. When they become employed again they will have a 0 < 0.82. The optimal contract will set a 1 > a 0 but also a 1 < 0.82. This argument demonstrates that the upper bound of the steady state wealth distribution is strictly less than the buffer stock. Notes: The table shows the effects of various benefit schemes on the average levels of consumption and the fraction of agents that are at the unconstrained optimum. b j is the level of benefits given in period j + 1 of an unemployment spell. Hence, j = 0 corresponds to benefits received during the first quarter, j = 1 during the second and so on. b * denotes the optimal policy. As discussed in text we have * 0 = 1.55 * 1 = 0.1 * ≥2 = 0.25. For the remaining columns the level of unemployment benefits in j is reported when b j > 0. denotes average consumption of employed individuals.
denotes average consumption of unemployed agents where j = 0, 1, ≥2 denotes the duration in unemployment. With ≥2 I pool together all agents who have been unemployed for at least two quarters.
The remaining columns in Table 2 give the average levels of consumption for employed individuals (second column) and unemployed individuals with duration j = 0, 1 (third and fourth columns) and j ≥ 2 (fifth column). To distinguish from previous notation I denote by the average consumption of employed agents and by , j ∈ {0, 1, ≥ 2} the analogous objects for unemployed agents. At j ≥ 2 I pool together all spells with durations exceeding 1 quarter. Note that since all employed individuals are at the unconstrained optimum, we have that
) (for all individuals and for the average). equals 0.949 and 0 0.791. Moreover, consumption drops during the unemployment spell. We have that 1 = 0.52 and ≥2 = 0.146. This is explained by the drop in wealth and the fact that b j = 0, j = 2, 3, ….
Should unemployment benefits be backloaded?
I now consider the effects of "backloading" unemployment benefits. I first let benefits be equal to zero at j = 0 and keep them constant at 0.5y at j = 1. Thereafter, benefits are equal to zero. The behavior of the model is evaluated in the new steady state.
The results from this policy change are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 (second row) and in Figure 2 . In the figure, the crossed (purple) line shows the new wage schedule. The region in which wages are frontloaded is now extended to the right, w 0 = 1.90 at a 0 = 0 and the buffer stock is at 1.39. From Table 1 we see that taxes drop by roughly 2.7 percentage points (3.3% vs. 0.66%), however, the unemployment rate and the fraction of agents which have experienced a duration less than or equal to two quarters (%u ≤1 , column 3) do not change. The labor market aggregates are unaffected by the new benefit scheme.
These results can be explained as follows: First, since w 0 increased, workers now hold more assets when they lose their jobs. The wealth effect reduces the search effort exerted during the first period of unemployment. At the same time, the government provides zero benefits in that period; therefore, the effect from benefits goes in the opposite direction. Higher wealth and lower benefits balance each other, in equilibrium there is no impact on the unemployment rates.
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In row 3 of Table 1 I show the effects from a policy which sets b 1 = 1 and b 0 = 0 (equivalent to postponing benefits relative to the benchmark); The effects are similar; under the new scheme wages become more frontloaded and the buffer stock level of savings increases. The dashed -dotted (black) line in Figure 2 shows the new wage schedule. Notice that now there is an impact on the unemployment rates since this policy increases the resources given to unemployed individuals. 16 Individuals reduce their search intensity, and the unemployment rate increases.
Welfare effects from backloaded benefits. Do individuals gain from these policies? I compute the compensating variation, the percentage increase in consumption needed to make agents willing to remain under the benchmark UI policy. The results are shown in columns 4-6 of Table 1.̃represents the average increment,ã nd̃represent the analogous increments for employed and unemployed individuals respectively. Under the new policies,̃equals roughly −0.40%. Agents are willing to give up 0.40 percent of consumption to remain in the old regime. I get similar numbers for employed and unemployed agents separately.
To understand this result consider again the numbers reported in Table 2 . From the second and third rows we see that "backloading benefits" decreases average consumption in employment. This may seem surprising since taxes drop, and as discussed previously, when r = 1 we have = − in the unconstrained optimum. However, decreases as now agents borrow more to insure against unemployment. This effect, together with the fact that in the model most individuals are employed, explains the welfare patterns.
The above results are robust across different specifications. For brevity, I considered only two policies here. However, I obtain very similar results under any b 1 maintaining b 0 = 0. Backloading benefits increases the cost of unemployment insurance through shifting the "insurance mix" away from public insurance and towards private insurance. This imparts a negative welfare effect on the population.
Should unemployment benefits be permanent?
Let me now assume that the government runs the following scheme: b j = 0.5y for j = 0, 1, 2, …. In other words, unemployment benefits last forever. This type of policy has been analyzed theoretically in many papers in the literature and therefore is worth considering here.
The effects are shown in Table 1 and Table 2 (row 4). The new policy reduces the amount of firm insurance. Wages drop and the new buffer stock of savings is 0.65. Table 1 shows the welfare impact. We havẽ= 0.19%. On average individuals gain from the new policy. This also holds separately for employed and unemployed individuals.
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From Table 2 we see that average consumption is lower relative to the benchmark: we have that = 0.945 vs. 0.949 in the benchmark. 18 It may therefore seem surprising that permanent benefits improve welfare for all agents. This happens because they provide insurance against long term unemployment. Since the terms U(a, j), j > 0 are discounted by the employed agents, they also gain from the policy change. Insuring agents against long durations of unemployment is, therefore, an important objective of the government.
Should unemployment benefits be frontloaded?
I now set b 0 > b j for j = 1, 2, …. In Table 1 and Table 2 , I study two such policies: First, I set b 0 = 1, b j = 0 and second, I set b 0 = 1 b j = 0.5. Under both cases the UI scheme decreases firm insurance. As Table 1 shows, under the second scheme, we get w 0 = 1.03 at a 0 = 0 and the buffer stock equals 0.08.
The large response of firm insurance to the new policies can be explained as follows: Since firms can insure their workforce only against short term unemployment, frontloading benefits has a large direct effect on the private insurance arrangement; b 0 impacts directly the utility U(a, 0) and decreases the derivative U a (a t , 0). To maintain the ratio = (1 + 1 − ) the firm must now promise to pay a higher level of at the unconstrained optimum. This is unsustainable over a long horizon. The firm's constraint binds and as we previously saw, consumption drops over time. This argument explains why now, over a much wider wealth region, the firm's constraint is binding. Table 2 shows the average consumption levels. Consider first the properties of consumption in unemployment. The new policies give levels 0 = 0.808 and 0.872, higher than any scheme previously studied. The fraction of individuals who are at the unconstrained optimum equals 76% in the case of the first policy and 0% under the second policy. The ratios 0 equal 1.179 and 1.077 respectively.
19 This is considerably lower than 1 + ( 1 − 1) 1 ≈ 1.2 under the baseline parameters.
The unemployed have to save. To have a substantial fraction of individuals whose wealth endowment is large enough so that in equilibrium the firms' constraints bind, it does not suffice to lower the buffer stock; it is also important that unemployed individuals want to save, at least in some periods, and their target level of savings exceeds the buffer stock of employed agents. This is indeed a property of "frontloaded benefits": unemployed individuals want to save at j = 0 because they know that benefits will drop in the following periods.
To illustrate this, in Figure 3 I show the savings schedules as functions of wealth. I plot many cases in the figure; the top left panel corresponds to the benchmark model, the top right shows the case of permanent benefits and the bottom panels show the two frontloaded schemes. The solid (blue) lines show savings for employed agents, the dashed (red) lines for unemployed agents at j = 0. The dashed-dotted (black) lines are at 45 degrees. Consider the bottom panels, left and right. These show clearly that the buffer stock of savings of employed agents corresponds to a lower wealth level than the buffer stock of unemployed agents. In the bottom right for example, we get 0.08 and 0.71 for employed and unemployed individuals respectively. Unemployed agents save considerably during the first quarter; then, with a large probability, they return to employment and their wealth level already exceeds the buffer stock of the employed. This happens only when benefits are frontloaded.
Welfare under frontloaded benefits. Columns 4-6 of Table 1 present the welfare effects of "frontloading" benefits. There are substantial gains for both unemployed and employed individuals. Paying benefits equal to 1 only during the first period of unemployment, yields a compensating variation coefficient of 0.2%, the analogous number in the case of the scheme b 0 = 1 b j = 0.5, j > 0 is 54% (51% for employed agents and 98% for the unemployed). The second policy performs better than the first one because it produces a smaller drop in consumption during unemployment.
Welfare maximizing benefit scheme
I now turn to the evaluation of the benefit scheme which maximizes welfare. I consider a restricted class of policies here, in particular policies which pay out different levels of benefits over three time intervals: the government pays b 0 to the newly unemployed, b 1 to those who have already been unemployed for one quarter, and b ≥2 for durations exceeding two quarters. I maximize welfare over b 0 , b 1 and b ≥2 .
I restrict the analysis along these lines for two reasons: First, because in the model most spells end after two quarters. Therefore, extending the analysis to more complex benefit schemes should not affect my conclusions. Second, because with too few agents experiencing durations longer than three quarters it is computationally very difficult to maximize welfare with respect to the benefit level in the fourth, the fifth quarter and so on; the optimal policy is close to indeterminate in these cases. Given these remarks, I suspect that the results I present in this paragraph are close to "optimal" in the sense that if the government were allowed to chose a longer sequence of b j , j = 0, 1, 2, 3, … the implications that I derive here would not be affected.
The welfare maximizing policy is the following: b 0 equals 1.55, b 1 equals 0.1 and finally, b ≥2 = 0.25. With these benefit levels the gain relative to the baseline UI scheme is 0.687%. For employed individuals it is 0.63% and for unemployed individuals 1.374%.
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The last rows of Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the properties of the model. There are several noteworthy features: From Table 1 , the buffer stock of savings for employed individuals is equal to zero. This means that when the worker becomes employed, it is optimal to reduce her stock of savings until the borrowing constraint is hit. From Proposition 5 we know that the firm's participation constraint always binds and wages equal y. No agents receive a frontloaded wage in equilibrium.
Remarkably, under the welfare maximizing scheme, average consumption increases when agents become unemployed. I obtain 0 = 0.940 0.952 ≈ 0.987. But because benefits decrease sharply, consumption drops fast in subsequent periods. Since workers suffer with positive probability a drop in consumption at j = 1, 2, … it still holds that W(a, 0) > U(a, 0) (e.g. Assumption 2).
Extensions and robustness
The effects of interest rates
The analysis of the previous sections illustrated that when the cost of borrowing from the firm is large, in an unconstrained optimum the worker suffers a big drop in consumption during the first period in unemployment. With the benchmark parameters this drop was in the order of 17.3%. The smaller the difference between 1 and r, the smaller this loss of consumption is. I now relax the assumption that workers earn zero return on their savings. I let the net rate of return r − 1 be equal to 0.5% (giving an annual return of roughly 2%). I keep β at its previous level. With the new parameters 1 + 1 − ≈ 1.099. Under the new calibration, I repeat the numerical experiments of the previous section. For brevity the results are summarized in the Online Appendix A (see Tables 4 and 5 ). There are several features worth highlighting here: First, under all UI schemes considered w 0 and the buffer stock of savings increase, since the drop in consumption in unemployment is smaller. Second, the distribution of welfare gains and loses across UI schemes is somewhat different than under the benchmark calibration. Whereas policies which backload benefits continue to produce welfare loses, these are now smaller in magnitude. 21 Moreover, the constant benefit policy no longer imparts a positive welfare effect to the population (̃= −0.20% for all agents).
To understand these findings note first that "backloading benefits" becomes less harmful owing to the fact that the cost of private insurance is now smaller. It is less inefficient to let firms insure their workers against unemployment, government insurance no longer corrects a large inefficiency when it crowds out private insurance. Second, in cases where the government pays positive benefits forever, the cost from distortionary taxation offsets any gain from crowding out private insurance. Third, constant benefit policies are now less beneficial because assets earn a higher return; when the agent is unemployed her consumption drops at a slower pace when r > 1. Unemployment insurance becomes less necessary to finance consumption over long durations of unemployment.
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The optimal UI scheme is as follows: b 0 = 1.05 and b 1 = b ≥2 = 0. The compensating variation coefficient equals 0.29%. In the steady state a small fraction of individuals (38%) are at the unconstrained optimum, the remaining agents have assets which exceed the buffer stock of savings. This makes the ratio ≈ 1.083 slightly lower than 1.099. The scope of government provided unemployment insurance when the interest rate is higher is clearly more limited, however, the conclusion that unemployment benefits should be frontloaded remains.
Benefits under flat wage contracts
In now turn to the properties of the welfare maximizing policy in the heterogeneous agents model. Note that though the optimal policy under limited commitment (when r = 1) lead essentially to a "heterogeneous agent outcome" it is not obvious that the two models produce the same welfare maximizing policy. In the heterogeneous agent model wages are flat under all UI schemes, under limited commitment they are not. The government faces different tradeoffs, this may give rise to different outcomes in terms of policy.
In the model with r = 1 I obtain the following "optimal" policy: b 0 = 1.6389 b 1 = 0.1444 and b ≥2 = 0.3667. Moreover, when I assume that r − 1 = 0.5% I get b 0 = b 1 = b ≥2 = 0 (i.e. it is optimal to have no public unemployment insurance at all). In both cases the welfare gains from switching to the welfare maximizing policy are substantial. I obtain values for the compensating variation equal to 0.4649 and 0.3788 respectively.
To explain the driving force behind these results it is important to remember that the two models impart a very different behavior on savings. Under heterogeneous agents (precautionary) savings yield a consumption level for the employed individual which increases over time (until the stationary buffer stock is built). In that model the cost of private insurance is measured in terms of the rising consumption path. Under the optimal contract, asset accumulation is frontloaded and the stationary stock is built in one period; the cost of insurance in this case is the interest rate cost on the loan given from the firm to the worker.
When r = 1 both models clearly yield a substantial cost of private insurance: When the interest rate in the market is low, the cost of accumulating precautionary savings is high, as the optimal consumption path would be decreasing (at rate β) if the government eliminated the risk of unemployment. Therefore, in both cases the government has the incentive to completely crowd out asset accumulation. When r increases the costs of insurance are mitigated in both models.
To conclude, the optimal policy is similar between the limited commitment model and the heterogeneous agent model when r = 1. However, it is different when r > 1. The differences between the two models are worth to be separately considered in future work.
Decentralizing through severance payments
One of the goals of this paper was to extend the limited commitment model of wages to endogenous savings. A key prediction of the model is that wages may be frontloaded. Though the idea that wages are paid upfront may seem odd, the allocation predicted by the model can be decentralized into a constant wage and severance payment scheme. This for example is the case if we assume that the difference a 1 − a 0 is set aside and given to the worker when she becomes unemployed. 23 Since severance payments are a very common private insurance arrangement in the US [see for example Chetty (2008) and Pissarides (2010) ] the wage profile predicted by the model becomes a reasonable approximation of the data.
Given the link between firm insurance and severance compensation in the model, it is interesting to investigate whether current policies in the US discriminate between cases where workers receive severance and cases where they do not. To answer this question data were collected from different states to obtain information on the treatment of severance payments by the state authorities.
24 Table 3 summarizes the information. There are basically two types of policies followed: in the first column I list states in which if the applicant has received severance payments, benefits are reduced by the weekly prorated amount of these payments. Under column (2) I show the remaining states, in which benefits are either reduced only in the week the severance payment is received, or they are not reduced at all. Approximately, I think of column (1) states, as states where benefits are foregone in the presence of private risk sharing and column (2) states, as states where benefits are not contingent on the receipt of private insurance. Table 3 : UI scheme and severance pay.
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(1) Should benefits be contingent on severance payments as is the case in Colorado, or should they complement private insurance as in California? I considered policies which eliminated benefits during the first quarter of unemployment. Approximately this can be thought as reducing unemployment benefits when workers receive firm insurance.
26 When I set b 0 = 0 private insurance was crowded in. However, my simulations showed that workers strictly prefer not to have b 0 = 0. The reason is that private risk sharing is more costly (and less efficient) than public insurance.
Conclusions
This paper studies the effects of unemployment benefits, in an economy where firms offer to their workforce a contract subject to limited commitment. It is shown that when workers have access to a storage technology, savings are utilized to provide (partial) insurance against the risk of a job separation. The participation constraints implied by limited commitment influence the scope of risk sharing. In this environment the government has the explicit goal to drive the allocation to the point where the firm's participation constraint is binding. I illustrate that at this point the drop in consumption suffered by the worker when she becomes unemployed is smaller. The welfare maximizing UI scheme entails large frontloaded benefits.
A number of extensions are worth considering. First, it was assumed that matches terminate through exogenous job destruction shocks. This has left out of the analysis match quality shocks. It is worth exploring how these additional sources of risk may impact the optimal contract in the presence of savings. This is not trivial; since assets break the link between consumption and wages, wages may become very volatile without resulting in excess volatility of consumption. It would be interesting to investigate whether commitment affects the variability of wages in the way that the existing literature has identified. Moreover, job retention effort [e.g. Wang and Williamson (2002) ] could be an important addition to the framework. When worker effort determines the probability of a separation, the optimal contract trades-off insurance against retention in the presence of a potent wealth effect. Modelling this tradeoff in the case where effort is not observable by the firm and studying the effects of unemployment benefits, adds another important and interesting layer to the analysis presented.
where and are subsets of the relevant state space and μ (u, , j) , μ (e, , ) are the probability distributions conditional on employment status. (x) is an indicator variable which takes the value one if x is true and zero otherwise.
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Proof of Proposition 2 Suppose that we have ϕ 0 = 0 and ϕ T > 0 for some T. From (7) and (8) = we have that consumption and assets are constant. From the agent's budget constraint it must also be that wages are constant. From the promise keeping constraints it is trivial to show that the Js are constant.
Given this property we can write (J 0 , J 1 , …, J T , J T + 1 ) = (0, , …, , 0). J starts at zero, subsequently remains to some constant value > 0 for T periods and then drops to 0. The sequence of wages between period 0 and T satisfies: ( 0 , 1 , ..., −1 , ) = ( + (1 − ) , − (1 − (1 − )) , ..., − (1 − (1 − )) , − ).
To simplify assume wlog that r = 1 and τ = 0. We have that = − (1 − (1 − )) . Moreover, a 1 = a 2 = … = a T = a 0 + ≡ . Let̃denote the level of assets in T + 1; we obtain:̃= − (1 − ) . In T + 1 assets drop since wages drop in T.
To show that the worker cannot optimize and choose (a T + 1 , J T + 1 ) = (̃, 0) I proceed in two steps. First, I assume that there is a unique optimum in terms of the policy rule which solves the value function. Otherwise, if the agent is indifferent between ( , ) and (̃, 0) in period T, she will also be indifferent in period 0 as will become evident subsequently. 28 We can now rule out T > 1 through claiming that (̃, 0) is obviously inconsistent with this worker's optimization. Notice that in T − 1 we have:
since the vector ( ,̃, 0) is in the constraint set in T − 1. However, in T we have that
In other words, the agent solved the same program in T − 1 as in T and with exactly the same state variables. Unless she is indifferent between the two solutions we have a contradiction.
This contradiction is not obvious in the case where T = 1 (since now W(a T − 1 , J T − 1 ) = W(a 0 , 0)). To show the problem in this case note that since ϕ 0 = 0 we have that:
Again (̃, 0) is affordable in period zero sincẽ= a 0 + y − . Now consider the agent's program in period 1. The agent has two choices: i) to remain in the unconstrained optimum (i.e. (a 2 , J 2 ) = ( , )) 29 , ii) to choose (a 2 , J 2 ) = (̃, 0). In either case consumption in period one must equal because of (7). Assume that ii) is preferred over i). Then we have:
which contradicts (11). Hence, i) is preferable to ii). ■.
Since the program is recursive it is trivial to generalize the above to have that if ϕ t = 0 then ϕ t + j = 0 for j > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
To prove that the optimal contract is a flat contract insofar as the firm's constraint is binding, I show here that when the constraint binds it binds forever. In other words, the only possibility is to have T = ∞ (where T is the last period that the constraint binds in proposition 4). Then, it is trivial to show that w t = y ∀t. This can be immediately seen from the firm's promise keeping constraint and the fact that J t = 0 ∀t. Assume that T < ∞. We have that ϕ t > 0 for t = 0, 1, 2, …, T − 1 but then ϕ T = 0 and the firm's constraint never binds again after T + 1. 30 From the promise keeping constraint of the firm we can show that w 0 = w 1 = … = w T − 1 = y. From Proposition 1 we know that subsequently we have w T ≥ y and w t = ≤ y, t = T + 1, T + 2, ….
From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that if the constraint ceases to bind the worker's wealth follows a T ≤ a T + 1 = a T + 2 = … =̃(a T < a T + 1 if w T > y) and J T + 1 = J T + 2 = … = ≥ 0. Before period T, since the firm's constraint binds, assets and consumption drop over time (e.g. (7)). Therefore a 0 > a 1 > … > a T and 0 > 1 > ... > = +1 = .... Consumption drops over time and remains constant from period T onwards.
From equation (8) for t ≤ T and t > 1 we have that
Note that according to the above equation, it holds that < +1
+1
. Since = +1 this implies that > +1 .
This contradicts the assumption that a T ≤ a T + 1 from the fact that = ( , 0). This path is therefore not consistent with the worker's optimization. There cannot be any T < ∞ such that the firm's constraint ceases to bind. ■. The optimality conditions hold only when T = ∞ (put differently, when the firm's constraint always binds). The fact that the constraint always binds should not be surprising. In standard incomplete market models which feature a buffer stock savings, the level of assets which defines the buffer stock is reached in the limit. Here the optimality conditions suggest that the contract features an analogous property. Assets are reduced by smaller and smaller amounts, and in the limit the firm's constraint becomes slack.
Notes
1 A more recent contribution is Voena (2015) who models the savings decisions of married couples under limited commitment. 2 I drop all time subscripts from the Bellman equation and use primes to denote next period variables. 3 Assets are contractible and observable to the firm. When the firm maximizes profits, it chooses wages, assets and the promised utility to the worker as in KM. See derivations in the online Appendix A. 4 Clearly when b j = 0 the constraint a t + 1 ≥ 0 will not bind since it coincides with the natural borrowing limit of the unemployed agent [see Aiyagari (1994) ]. In this case the Euler equation holds as an equality. 5 Leaving out the worker's constraint is (technically) equivalent to solving the optimal contract under one sided limited commitment [e.g. Rudanko (2009)] . In other words, I could setup the Bellman equation (2) ignoring the constraint W(a', J') ≥ U(a', 0). The more complete formulation which includes the constraint serves to highlight that the condition W(a', J') > U(a', 0) is a result of the worker's optimization, not an ad hoc assumption. Though I cannot provide an analytical proof for this property, I provide an intuition based on the features of the optimal allocation identified in this section. I leave it to the Online Appendix A to rederive the optimality conditions including the terms which reveal the influence of the worker's constraint. 6 In the Online Appendix A I utilize a Lagrangian formulation to show this. This interpretation is standard in the literature [see LTW and Marcet and Marimon (2002) ]. 7 Another way of saying this is that when employed, the agent effectively has access to two types of assets: a non-state contingent asset with return r (subject to the borrowing restriction) and a state contingent one which pays out a return 1 > in the event she remains 11 In the heterogeneous agents literature the buffer stock of savings behavior is also not shown analytically. One can establish that savings diverge when βr ≥ 1, however, there is no analytic proof showing that savings converge under βr < 1 [see for example Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) ]. The buffer stock is typically demonstrated graphically, the graphs summarize the numerical solution to the models. I could have followed this approach but the analytical version of the model employed in this subsection is useful to demonstrate the wage profile derived in the previous Propositions. 12 It is straightforward to show that the the buffer stock under heterogeneous agents is also equal to( 1− ) .
13 This is not a tight argument. The worker may borrow an amount slightly lower than 0 2 + 1 and pay back the loan almost surely. 14 This corresponds to the current policy in most states in the US, assuming that benefits are not extended (as is typical) in periods of "high unemployment". Since my target rate of unemployment is 6.2%, the baseline calibration is realistic. 15 The new wage schedule is roughly 0.5 points higher under the new policy than under the benchmark. Since assets earn zero net return, benefits and wealth are perfect substitutes. Another way of saying this is that with r = 1 the worker's consumption is not financed through assets. As we have seen, a t remains constant for t ≥ 1, the worker consumes − τ in every period. Wealth is only used to provide insurance against unemployment.
16 The net effect is no longer equal to zero; if an individual remains unemployed for at least two periods then the benefits received are the same as under the benchmark. However, w 0 and assets have increased. 17 In Figure 4 in the Online Appendix A I study the welfare impact of different levels of permanent benefits. I find that i) individuals gain as long as b j > 0.3 and b j < 0.65 and ii) the optimum level of benefits is close to 0.5. 18 Again it holds that = − . Taxes increase under permanent benefits and the average drops since now individuals run down their wealth faster in unemployment (they can rely on benefits to finance consumption). This property is echoed on the consumption levels 1 = 0.569 and ≥2 = 0.501. Because of this property, many agents start their new jobs with wealth close to zero, and borrow more from their employers. 19 The average consumption of employed individuals equals roughly 0.95 under the first scheme and 0.94 under the second (Table 2) . Both numbers exceed y − τ. As we have seen, when the firm's participation constraint binds, consumption drops over time. It equals y − τ in the limit, when wealth converges to the buffer stock. 20 I leave for future work to study the welfare effects in the transition. The reader may have noticed that switching to the 'optimal scheme' from the benchmark, may imply that participation is not satisfied for some individuals in the economy. Agents which begun their jobs with low a 0 under the old regime and chose a high J 1 = J 2 = … may find that now with higher benefits it is preferable to quit their jobs. This clearly cannot happen in steady state. 21 For example,̃= −0.22% when b 1 = 0.5 and b j = 0, j ≠ 1. 22 See for example the average consumption patterns at j = 1 and j ≥ 2 documented in Table 5 in the Appendix A. See also Young (2004) for a discussion of this effect in general equilibrium in the standard heterogeneous agents model. 23 The simplest case to visualize this is r = 1, c e = − τ and assets are not used to finance consumption during employment. Then, we can let w t = for all t. The difference a 1 − a 0 represents the severance payment. In the Online Appendix A I show that the optimal allocation when the worker chooses assets and severance payments, can indeed be interpreted as a frontloaded wage profile. Though this is a general result, to obtain the exact profile I had in the previous sections, I need to introduce a few frictions to the model. I assume that i) the firm can make positive profits if severance payments are positive and ii) the worker does not internalize the effect of her choices on the firm's profits. These are two simple modifications of the problem, possibly not the only ones I could have used. They are important since when R > r severance payments modify the constraint set and the higher rate R creates wealth intertemporally. See Pissarides (2010) for a deeper microfoundation of why severance payments do not provide complete insurance. 24 The data were collected from the web and through phone interviews with personnel in the relevant agencies. Three states are missing because the web did not provide any information concerning the treatment of severance compensation and the phone numbers listed were not responding. 25 Since 1 week is a small fraction of the horizon over which unemployment benefits are paid (6 months) I treat this as a case as no reduction of benefits. Moreover, in all states in which benefits are reduced by the prorated amount, they are typically foregone. The worker is not entitled to unemployment benefits if her spell exceeds 6 months. The exception to this rule is the state of Arizona. 26 As I showed, in the benchmark model and in the models with backloaded benefits, all individuals get firm insurance. Hence eliminating unemployment benefits for all agents is equivalent to eliminating them for agents which receive firm insurance. 27 For brevity I use the same number of arguments in μ (e,.,.) and μ (u,.,. ) . The third argument however is J (promised utility) if the agent is employed, and j (duration of the spell) if she is unemployed. 28 Generally, proving that the optimal policy is single valued is not possible in the commitment problem (see LTW). One has to rely on simulations of the model to verify that the value function is strictly concave. This property holds in my numerical solution. 29 If the agent chooses the unconstrained optimum she must set a 2 = since = 2 = . This nonlinear equation gives the same solution for since U a is monotonically decreasing in assets. 30 As discussed, if a constraint ceases to bind, then it never binds again (e.g. Proposition 2).
